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IN THE SUP'REME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTHEAST FURNITURE COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
GRANITE HOLDING C01fPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9175 
REP'L Y BRIEF Q~F APPELLANT 
The brief of respondent sets forth some matters of 
purported law and fact which appellant hereto replies. 
Point I 
Section 78-24-2(3) U.C.A. 1953, the so-called De,ad Ma,n1s 
Statute, does not Pertain to or Render any of Appellanrs 
Witnesses Incompetent to Testify in this Action. 
Respondent contends in its Point I that the executed 
Oral Agreement creating the joint and reciprocal right 
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of way over· the adjoining lands of the parties is proved 
in the record by testimony of witnesses incompetent to 
testify under the Dead Man's Statute. The respondent 
in support of its contention does not attempt to point 
out what witnesses are incompetent nor what testimony 
from such witnesses was inadmissable. Further, respon-
dent cites no cases or authorities in support of the 
applicability of the Statute. 
There are several reasons why appellant's witnesses 
and their testimony were not excludable under the Dead 
Man's Statute. In discussing these reasons, it should be 
remembered that the Oral Agreement was negotiated by 
and between the appellant corporation and the respon-
dent corporation acting through their respective officers. 
The two principal officers involved in negotiating the 
contract, Nephi Hansen for the appellant and S. E. 
Sorenson for the respondent, were both deceased some-
time before this action was initiated. 
1. Where both parties to a contract are dead, the 
Statute excluding testimony of transactions with the 
decedent is not applicable. Since both parties to the 
contract are deceased, the inequality of positions to 
which the Statute is directed does not exist. (97 C.J.S., 
Witnesses, Sec. 203, page 646, Atkin's Estate v. Atkin's 
Estate, 37 A. 746, 69 Vt. 270). 
2. Appellant's witnesses in this action do not come 
' within the class of those intended to be silenced by the 
statute. The decease of one who entered into a trans-
action with a corporation does not prevent the officer 
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of such corporation who negotiated the transaction from 
testifying concerning the transaction entered into. The 
rule in this regard is stated in 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, 
Section 313, page 191, as follows : 
"In the majority of cases statutes making 
persons who are parties to or interested in a 
suit against the estate of one deceased or a lunatic 
incompetent to testify concerning a personal 
transaction had with him have been construed as 
not rendering the officers of the corporation in-
competent to testify as to transactions or commu-
nications with the decedent. Accordingly, it is 
held that the directors of a corporation, its gen-
eral manager, cashier, agents, or employees, even 
when liable over to the corporation are competent 
to testify.'' 
A similar rule as to agents and employees in gen-
eral is stated at 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, Sec. 309, p. 189, 
as follows: 
"A statute prohibiting the 'parties' to a suit 
against the estate of a decedent or a lunatic from 
giving evidence is construed not to include the 
agents of parties who are not made parties to 
the action;. it is said that to hold that agents are 
also barred from giving evidence by the statute 
would obviously be adding to its terms. So, too, 
under statutes disqualifying a 'party in interest' 
or 'person interested in the event' it is held that 
the agent is not rendered incompetent as a wit-
ness for his principal by the death of the party 
with whom he dealt." (See also 21 A.L.R. 928) 
3. The respondent does not come within the class 
of persons who are protected by the statute. The case 
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of Beaston, et al. vs. Portland Trust and Savings Bank, 
80 W. 627, 155 P. 162, also involved the establishment 
of a right growing out of a transaction entered into by 
officers of two different corporations, one of whom was 
deceased at the time of the action. The case in applying 
a statute almost identical with the Utah statute held as 
follows: 
"Rem. & Bal. Code, Sec. 1211 providing that, in 
an action or a proceeding where the adverse party 
sues or defends as deriving right or title by, 
through, or from any deceased person, a party in 
interest shall not be permitted to testify in his 
own behalf as to any transaction had by him with 
the deceased, does not exclude the testimony of 
an officer and stockholder of one corporation from 
testifying as to a transaction had by him, as such 
officer, with an officer and stockholder, since de-
ceased, of another corporation, from which the 
-vvitness' corporation derives a right or title which 
it seeks to assert.'' 
The express terms of the lTtah statute refers only 
to natural persons and not to corporations. The Wash-
ington court in the above referred to Beaston case acting 
under a similar statute points out that the exclusion of 
the Statute does not pertain to a corporation. The Court 
in that case states as follows: 
''Our statute, it will be observed, applies, in 
its tenns, only in the case of the death of a natural 
person who is a principal in the contract. It makes 
no reference to corporations, or to agents of cor-
porations, or even to agents of deceased natural 
persons, and to read into it, this further excep-
tion would be, we believe, an unwarranted exten-
sion of its terms." 
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A similar rule is stated in the Colorado case of 
Garden of the Gods Village v. Hellman, 294 P. 2d, 597. 
This was an action against a corporate defendant for 
damages from blasting where the corporate president 
who directed the work died prior to the action, and the 
court held that admitting testimony of statements made 
by the president during the course of the operations and 
after plaintiffs discovered their damages did not violate 
the Dead Man's Statute. 
It seems clear that the sole purpose of the language 
of the Utah Statute is to prevent the proving by false 
testimony of claims against the estate of a deceased or 
incompetent person. In other words, it is directed at 
conserving the estate of a deceased or incompetent per-
son and, therefore, it is applied only in cases where an 
estate of a deceased or incompetent person is involved. 
The Statute expressly lists the class of persons protected 
by the Statute using the following designations: guard-
ian, executor or administrator, heir, legatee, or devisee 
of any deceased person or assignee or grantee of any 
of them. All of these designations contemplate the in-
volvement of an estate. Therefore, under the Utah 
Statute at least, unless the estate of a deceased or in-
competent person is involved in the action, the Statute 
would not apply. The following excerpts from the 
majority opinion and concurring opinions in the Utah 
case of Maxfield vs. Sainsbury,. 172 P. 2d 122 support 
this contention : 
"The statute's sole purpose is to prevent the 
proving of false testimony of claims against the 
estate of a deceased person." 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
''To extend this statutory disqualification to 
include a party not suing or opposing the exe.cu-
tor ... would be to totally disrega!d ~he wordill:g 
of the statute and its past apphcat1on by this 
court.'' 
''The central and starting point of the inquiry 
(as to the disqualification of the witness) being 
whether one of the class to be protected, i. e. guard~ 
ian, executor, administrator, heir, legatee, devisee, 
or assignee or grantee of any of them, is suing 
or defending." 
Appellant's witness, Clyde F. Hansen, does not 
come under any aspect of the Dead Man's Statute. 
Clyde F. Hansen was secretary of the Appellant Cor-
poration up to sometime in 1945 (R. 88), and was per-
sonally present at the time the agreement as to the right 
of way was negotiated between the appellant corpora-
tion, Nephi Hansen, acting for it, and the respondent 
corporation, S. E. Sorenson, acting for it, during the 
period of about 1941 and 1942 (R. 85), both of whom are 
deceased, but he has not been an officer of nor had any 
pecuniary interest in the appellant corporation since 
about 1945 (R. 88, 89). In view of this, he cannot be 
classified as an interested person, and he would be a 
competent witness for the appellant even if he were not 
competent under the rules discussed above. The interest 
that would disqualify a witness must exist at the time 
that the person is produced and used as a witness. The 
rule in this regard is stated at 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, 
Section 280, page 178, as follows : 
''As a general rule, the existence of the dis-
qualifying interest, within the meaning of the 
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dead man statute, is to be determined as of the 
time the testimony sought to be excluded is of-
fered." 
Further, appellant's witness, Mr. Richards, could not be 
classified as a directly interested party or person under 
the statute. He was merely a witness to a transaction 
between both of the now deceased officers of the parties. 
(R. 114, 117, 120) 
Point II 
Counterclaim not Required to be S·e,rved as a Summons. 
Respondent's argument under its Point VIII that 
appellant's counterclaim was required under Rule 5 (a) 
to be served as a Summons in order to be effective and 
controlling in this action is not only specious but novel. 
This contention is against the universal interpretation 
and practice. Respondent cites no cases or authorities 
in support of its interpretation of this rule. Further, 
Respondent admits that it was actually served and 
received a copy of the Answer and Counterclaim. 
Under Rule 13, it is compulsory that a counterclaim 
which "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that 
is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim" 
must be included with the answer if such counterclaim 
is to be asserted at all. Such a counterclaim has always 
been considered as part of the answer to be served with 
it and in accordance with the procedure provided for 
the service of an answer. A careful search by counsel 
has failed to disclose any case or authority with a dif-
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ferent interpretation or holding. The only reasonable 
interpretation to attach to the exception set out in Rule 
5(a) "that pleadings asserting new or additional claims 
for relief ... shall be served ... in the manner provided 
for service of summons in Rule 4'' is that a plaintiff in 
asserting new or additional relief such as might be in-
cluded in an amended or supplemental complaint would 
have to serve such pleading in the manner provided for 
a summons. 
While a compulsory counterclaim asserts a separate 
cause in the action and seeks affirmative relief, it is 
only asserted if the cause "arises out of the transaction 
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing 
party's claim". Therefore, since the cause in such a 
counterclaim is responsive to, grows out of, and is 
limited by the subject matter of the complaint, it does 
not assert such a new or additional claim as is contem-
plated by Rule 5(a). It is appropriate to treat it as 
part of the answer and require only such service as is 
required for an answer. 
Further, respondent never appeared specially to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the court to proceed on the 
Counterclaim. The respondent filed a reply to the 
Counterclaim and appeared generally in response to it 
throughout the entire proceedings in this case. In fact, 
it was the only pleading before the court for trial after 
the respondent voluntarily dismissed its complaint at 
the beginning of the trial. No objection was made to the 
jurisdiction of the court to proceed with the trial on 
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the Counterclaim, and the respondent proceeded to 
defend against the Counterclaim. 
The respondent having made a general appearance 
to the Counterclaim, he is bound by all of the conse-
quences which followed from the time of the filing and 
serving of the Counterclaim, including a default judgment 
that had been entered on the Counterclaim. 
Point III 
App,ellanrs Mo·tion to Amend Counterc:laim and Prayer 
to Confo.rm to the Evidence was Gra,nted .. 
Respondent on page 3 in its Statement of Facts and 
again on page 19 in its argument under its Point X 
states that the court denied Appellant's Motion to 
Amend its Counterclaim and Prayer to Conform to the 
Evidence. This statement by Respondent is not correct. 
The Court's Order dated October 29, 1959, and appear-
ing on page 57 of the record unequivocally states that 
''the motion to conform to proof is granted''. The 
Court, therefore, had before it, in advance of making its 
findings of facts and conclusions of law and before 
entering judgment, all of the material issues asserted in 
this appeal. The record, therefore, supports the conten-
tions of appellant in Points X and XI of its brief that 
it \Yas prejudicial for the Court not to make findings 
which were responsive to and which covered all of the 
material issues raised by the pleadings, and that the 
findings and judgment are contrary to the evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in appellant's principle 
brief and supplemented herein, it is respectfully re-
quested that the judgment of the trial court be reversed 
and the case remanded with instructions to enter judg-
ment for appellant, giving appellant and those claiming 
by, through, or under it, the right to use the right of 
way referred to herein in accordance with the detailed 
provisions of the default judgment in the record (R. 17) 
or a judgment that such right of way is a public way. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OWEN &WARD 
Counsel for Defendamt 
and Appellant 
141 East Second South St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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